Timeline
209 moments from 1 Sep 2021 to 31 Dec 2026 — the events in each causal chain, the sources behind them, every estimate as it moved, and every correction. Nothing here was written for this page; it is the archive on one axis.
Dates are shown exactly as they were written. 35 are known only to the month, 16 span a period, and 1 has no date at all — kept here rather than dropped, because an undated step is still part of the chain. A date without a qualifier is a day we can point to.
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September 2021 1
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AUKUS is announced
The US, UK and Australia announce the trilateral pact, explicitly framed as a response to China's military buildup — Pillar 1 (nuclear submarines) and Pillar 2 (advanced technology).
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January 2022 1
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The Arctic Council freezes, then thaws slightly
The other seven Arctic Council members boycott Russia-linked proceedings after the invasion of Ukraine. Denmark takes the 2025–2027 chairmanship and secures a joint eight-state statement on peace and cooperation — a thin thread, not a restart.
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February 2022 2
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1 Feb 2
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Russia's invasion makes the Northern Corridor toxic
Sanctions and reputational risk push China–Europe shippers to start testing the Caspian-crossing alternative that avoids Russian territory entirely.
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Sanctions close the Western market
Russia's westward energy and financial channels begin shutting. At this point the yuan settles about 2% of Russia's external trade — the pivot has not started.
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March 2022 1
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Temporary protection triggered
The EU activates the Temporary Protection Directive for people fleeing Ukraine — residence and work rights without an asylum claim. The Directive's Article 4 caps protection at three years.
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January 2023 3
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1 Jan 2
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LKAB finds the deposit
State miner LKAB unveils Per Geijer next to its Kiruna iron-ore mine — 2.2 million tonnes of rare earth oxides, Europe's largest known deposit. The same announcement warns it will take at least 10–15 years to begin mining and reach the market.
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The EU makes it a Strategic Project
The Critical Raw Materials Act sets 2030 benchmarks for domestic mining, processing and single-country dependence, and Per Geijer becomes one of the EU's flagship projects to reduce reliance on China.
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January 2024 5
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1 Jan 5
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A surplus with nowhere to go
China accounts for roughly 30% of global manufacturing output against 13% of global consumption. Car exports to Europe rise 26% to almost 1.2 million vehicles; hybrid imports rise 155%.
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Brussels reaches for trade defence
Thirty-three trade investigations launched in 2024 and a similar number in 2025. EV duties land at 17% on BYD, 18.8% on Geely, over 35% on SAIC and 9% on China-made Tesla.
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Volume sixfolds, and China wins Anaklia
Caspian-crossing cargo hits 4.1 million tonnes (+63% YoY); the BTK railway's Georgian section is upgraded toward 5 Mt annual capacity; a Chinese consortium wins a 49% stake in Georgia's Anaklia deep-water port.
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The currency channel peaks
The yuan's share of Russia's external trade reaches nearly 40%, from 2% before the invasion. De-dollarisation looks like it is working.
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Volumes hit records
Trade peaks at US$245 billion. Russian oil to China passes 108 million tonnes, up about 30% since 2022; more than 70% of the trade's value is now mineral fuels. In physical terms the pivot has succeeded.
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March 2024 2
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Finland and Sweden complete NATO's Arctic ring
Finland joins NATO in April 2023 and Sweden in March 2024, closing the last gap in the alliance's coverage of the Arctic coastline and leaving Russia the only Arctic Council member outside NATO.
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April 2024 1
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November 2024 1
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Georgia suspends its own EU accession
Tbilisi announces it will pause EU integration until 2028; the EU formally suspends the accession process; mass protests begin and a 'foreign agent' law tightens on civil society through 2025–2026.
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January 2025 3
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1 Jan 3
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Russia builds up its NATO-facing infrastructure
Over the winter, a joint investigation maps new Russian military infrastructure along its entire western border, including opposite Finland and Norway, setting up a potential fourfold troop increase.
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The value falls while the tonnes hold
Trade falls 6.9% to US$228.1 billion — the first decline in five years. Crude import value drops 19.6% despite stable shipment volumes. The yuan's share of Russian trade slips from 40% to roughly 30% following US sanctions threats. The currency channel goes backwards under pressure while the pipeline does not.
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China turns rare earths into leverage
China — around 70% of global rare-earth mining and the dominant refiner — uses export controls as a lever in its trade disputes, converting a supply dependency into a strategic one that Europe cannot ignore.
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April 2025 2
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1 Apr 2
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Sanctioning Russia Act introduced
S.1241 would raise duties to not less than 500 percent ad valorem on any country knowingly purchasing Russian oil, uranium, gas or petroleum products. It names no country. It has not passed.
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June 2025 4
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1 Jun 3
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Contract cut-off for exemptions
Only Russian gas contracts concluded before 17 June 2025 can claim an exemption under what becomes Regulation (EU) 2026/261. Everything signed after this date is already inside the ban.
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Council extends to March 2027 — a fifth year
Member states unanimously extend on 13 June 2025, past the Directive's own three-year ceiling. Ciger argues the extension lacks a legal basis and leaves the door open to indefinite renewal. No final expiry is set.
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The last month of fast advance
Russian forces seize 481.25 km² in a single month — 16.04 km² per day — at a cost of roughly 68 casualties per km². This is the war as a territorial contest, and it is the last time the map moves at this speed.
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July 2025 1
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October 2025 2
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The EU commits Global Gateway billions
The EU and EBRD formalise over €10 billion in Central Asia and Caucasus transport connectivity pledges at a Luxembourg summit, explicitly framed against Russian and Chinese influence over the route.
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November 2025 2
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The rate starts falling
ISW dates the steady decline in Russia's rate of advance from here. Ukrainian counterattacks in the Kupyansk and Oleksandrivka directions hold through spring 2026 and are never rolled back.
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December 2025 2
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The numbers fall
EU+ asylum applications close 2025 at 822,000 — 19% below 2024, the lowest since 2021 (EUAA). The Commission records illegal border crossings down 26% over the same year.
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January 2026 10
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1 Jan 4
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Council adopts the phase-out
The Regulation clears the Council on 26 January and is published in the Official Journal on 2 February. The end of the relationship is now a legal schedule rather than a negotiation.
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EU restricts products refined from Russian crude
Fresh EU restrictions on imports of petroleum products derived from Russian crude take hold. The IEA records the effect immediately: key Indian export refineries begin looking for alternative supplies.
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Indian imports of Russian crude hit a 3-year low
Tanker tracking shows Indian imports of Russian crude at 1.1 mb/d — the lowest level since November 2022. The leak everyone was arguing about was already narrowing while the argument continued.
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The grid campaign and the appeal
Strikes leave 5,635 multi-storey buildings in Kyiv without heating; Volker Türk calls the targeting of civilian infrastructure 'a clear breach of the rules of warfare'. The UN appeals for $2.3bn to reach 4.1 million of the 10.8 million people it counts as in need.
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February 2026 8
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1 Feb 3
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War begins; transits collapse
Roughly 130 vessels a day were transiting the strait before the war started in late February.
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The world reroutes, drains and buys less
China cuts crude imports 40% (−4.6 mb/d). IEA members release 400m barrels, peaking at 2.5 mb/d in May. Saudi Yanbu exports go 2 → 5+ mb/d; UAE 1.9 → 4.3 mb/d; US exports hit a record 13.1 mb/d.
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A war over one chokepoint
The US–Iran war begins, fought from the start around the Strait of Hormuz — the corridor a fifth of the world's oil transits.
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The war begins
US–Israeli strikes open the war. The Israeli Air Force reports 500 targets hit with over 1,200 bombs in 24 hours; Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and thousands of Revolutionary Guard personnel are killed.
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March 2026 5
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1 Mar 4
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German energy prices spike — from Iran
Destatis reports energy producer prices up 7.5% month-on-month, the largest move since August 2022, attributed to the Iran–Middle East conflict via mineral oil products. Natural gas itself is down 8.0% year-on-year.
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Flows fall ~86%
Hormuz crude flows average 2.7 mb/d against about 20 mb/d pre-conflict. Cumulative Middle East supply losses pass 1.3 billion barrels.
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The Iran war pushes traffic onto BTK, then China exits Anaklia
The US–Iran war drives a 35% single-week spike in BTK freight traffic in March; BTK reaches full commercial operation on 2 June; on 6 July, China's consortium exits Anaklia and Georgia takes the port under state ownership, targeting first operations by 2029.
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April 2026 10
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Short-term LNG ban applies
The first prohibition bites: Russian LNG under short-term contracts is barred from 25 April 2026.
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20 Apr 2
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28 Apr 5
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The UK Defence Committee warns of slippage
Parliament's own Defence Committee finds 'shortcomings and failings' across delivery, says political leadership 'has faded', and cites HMS Anson — Britain's only attack submarine at sea in February 2026 — being recalled from an Australia rotation when a crisis broke out in the Gulf.
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May 2026 8
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The Ukrainian stock goes flat
4.38 million under temporary protection on 31 May, up 7,795 (+0.2%) on April. Whatever is moving, it is not this.
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8 May 2
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21 May 2
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The critics cite the Commission's own maths
Bruegel finds the 20% manufacturing target lacks economic rationale, and that the Commission's own impact assessment expects local-content exclusions to more than double the price of solar panels — while polysilicon still comes from China.
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28 May 2
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The EU edges toward its own Section 301
A €3 surcharge on sub-€150 parcels from 1 July 2026; the Critical Raw Materials Act caps single-country sourcing at 65% for strategic materials; proposed procurement rules would cap single suppliers at 30–40% of critical components.
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June 2026 26
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1 Jun 7
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NATO answers with Arctic Sentry and a Finland force
NATO launches Arctic Sentry on 11 February 2026 and stands up a Sweden-led multinational Forward Land Force in Finland in June 2026, initially around 600 personnel.
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Short-term pipeline ban applies
Russian pipeline gas under short-term contracts is prohibited from 17 June 2026. Long-term pipeline contracts run until 30 September 2027 — the relationship has a legally scheduled end date.
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The hardest framework in EU history applies
The Pact on Migration and Asylum enters into application on 12 June 2026 — ten interlinked legislative acts, EUR 3 billion in implementation support, stronger external border procedures. Twelve days after the flat reading, and six months after the four-year low.
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The plumbing is the constraint
Sberbank's first deputy chairman describes payment routes 'many times more complex', with intermediary banks rejecting transfers without explanation. Chinese banks choose access to the dollar system over access to Russian trade — the binding limit turns out to be the payment, not the barrel.
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The front all but stops
30.42 km² for the month — 1.01 km² per day, about 6% of June 2025 — at roughly 1,298 casualties per km². Nineteen times more blood for each kilometre than a year earlier.
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The same month is the deadliest since 2022
293 civilians killed and 1,990 injured — the worst month since April 2022, in the same weeks the front moves least. Long-range weapons drive the increase, striking urban centres far from any fighting.
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The enrichment program is destroyed
The strikes on Natanz and Fordow wreck almost 22,000 centrifuges and leave Iran with 'no identifiable route to produce weapon-grade uranium' in its enrichment plants — the first time in 20 years (ISIS). IAEA verification inside Iran stops on 28 February.
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3 Jun 5
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The Tech Sovereignty Package lands
Chips Act 2.0 and the Cloud and AI Development Act, plus an Open Source Strategy and a digitalisation-and-AI roadmap for energy.
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9 Jun 2
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10 Jun 2
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The first Pillar II Forum convenes
Government, industry and academia from all three states meet to shape the advanced-capability track — AI, cyber, quantum, hypersonics, undersea autonomy.
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17 Jun 2
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A 14-point truce memorandum
Signed on 17 June, opening 60 days of negotiations toward a final deal.
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A ceasefire is signed
A memorandum of understanding is signed — Trump at Versailles, President Pezeshkian in Tehran — opening a 60-day window to negotiate a final deal.
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30 Jun 3
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The Defence Investment Plan reconfirms the submarines
The UK commits £20 billion of new money to the Defence Nuclear Enterprise over four years, reconfirms up to 12 SSN-AUKUS boats, and sets steel-cutting on the first hull for 2027 at Barrow-in-Furness.
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July 2026 108
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1 Jul 6
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The hardware race stays lopsided
The US finalises contracts for 11 new Arctic Security Cutters, the first not due until 2028, against a Russian fleet of 45 polar icebreakers already in service — the troop build-up is faster than the capability build-up on either side.
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The gap that stays open
Britain's industrial commitment is funded and dated. Australia's side of Pillar 1 depends on a US Virginia-class production rate that has never reached even the Navy's own peacetime target, let alone the higher rate AUKUS needs — the load-bearing uncertainty the UK cannot resolve on its own.
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Steel quotas halved
Tariff-free steel quotas cut 47%, from roughly 33 to 18.3 million tonnes; out-of-quota duties double from 25% to 50% through 2031.
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The gap that stays open
The designation cannot waive the full environmental permit under Sweden's strict Environmental Code, the reindeer-herding and minority-rights obligations over the land, or the refining stage China dominates. Reuters carries the government's confident case; the barriers are documented alongside it.
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No route out
The Kremlin states there are 'no immediate prospects for resuming the negotiation process'. Ukraine wants a ceasefire first; Russia refuses one on the grounds it would let Ukraine regroup. Neither the military stalemate nor the civilian toll has produced a talks process.
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7 Jul 2
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Fighting resumes; ships struck
Three merchant ships struck in transit. Tracked crossings fall from 45 to five. Around 6,000 seafarers stranded; 14 killed in two days.
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8 Jul 4
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The ceasefire collapses
Both sides attack and Trump declares the memorandum 'over'. CENTCOM reports striking 90 targets across Iran's coast overnight and more than 80 the day before; the Revolutionary Guards say they hit US bases in Kuwait and Bahrain.
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9 Jul 2
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The price refuses to panic
Brent trades at $76.58 on 10 July, having recovered to about $77 the previous day — near where it sat before the largest chokepoint disruption on record.
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10 Jul 2
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13 Jul 2
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The targets change
US strikes now aim at 'Iran's ability to continue attacking international shipping' through Hormuz — not its nuclear sites — in the first use of one-way attack sea drones. The war's rationale has moved from centrifuges to the strait.
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14 Jul 8
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Formal Russia–Ukraine peace negotiations open before 31 Dec 2026
initial estimate
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The EU adopts a further Russia sanctions package before 31 Dec 2026
initial estimate
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The US claims the strait
Naval blockade on Iranian ports restarts. Trump: “we control it… we'll probably run it”, replacing a proposed 20% transit fee with Gulf trade and investment deals.
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15 Jul 29
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China announces a formal trade measure targeting a named EU sector before 31 Mar 2027
initial estimate — the steel quota cut and doubled out-of-quota duties through 2031 are large, dated and specific; Beijing has answered smaller EU measures before
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Chips Act 2.0 in force by 31 Dec 2027
initial estimate — proposed June 2026; ordinary legislative procedure on a contested industrial file rarely clears trilogue and entry into force inside 18 months, and the original Chips Act took longer
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EU opens a trade defence investigation into Chinese mature-node semiconductors before 31 Dec 2026
initial estimate — flagged as a policy concern but the EU has not moved; legacy chips are an input its own industry buys, which cuts against a fast probe
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Binding origin-based local-content requirements survive into an adopted EU industrial text before 31 Dec 2027
initial estimate — the Commission's own impact assessment and Bruegel both argue against, and WTO exposure is real; but the political demand for a visible Made-in-Europe instrument is stronger than the analysis against it
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German gas producer prices rise year-on-year (Destatis) in any month before 31 Dec 2026
Cut sharply on sourced data: German gas producer prices are down 8.0% year-on-year (Destatis, March 2026) and LNG supply is ample, which is the opposite of the modelled 3.1× spike. Not lower than even odds, because EU storage ended winter below 30% — a 9-year low (ACER) — and the March spike showed how fast a Middle East shock reaches German prices.
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The EU adopts a further Russia sanctions package before 31 Dec 2026
Lowered on sourcing: the gas phase-out is now law (Reg (EU) 2026/261) rather than pending, so the largest measure has already landed. Further packages remain likely — the Regulation itself prepares the ground for an oil ban — but the biggest one is no longer ahead of us.
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Removed every source attribution to a real organization.
Figures were presented as sourced from ENTSOG, IEA, Destatis, Eurostat, UNHCR, OFAC and others that were never consulted. The numbers are illustrative estimates and are now labelled as such.
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Impact Score corrected.
The headline had been typed in by hand and disagreed with its own five dimensions, which average 73.6. It is now computed from them. We could have kept 78 by reverse-engineering weights that produced it — that would have been choosing the answer first and calling it a method.
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Removed the claim that 61% of readers agreed with you.
The figure was hardcoded and shown identically whether you voted Yes or No — 61% agreeing with each side is 122% of readers. It told everyone the crowd was on their side. There is no vote store yet, so no aggregate is shown at all.
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Lowered confidence on Q2 (Confirmed → Likely) and Q4 (Likely → Uncertain).
The simple and full tabs carried separate confidence ratings and had drifted, with the simplified read systematically more confident than the considered one — aimed at the readers least able to discount it. Confidence is now one value per claim, and we took the more cautious of the two.
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Replaced the invented scenario with sourced reporting — and reversed the direction of the story.
This page was written as an illustrative sample to demonstrate the format. It modelled Russia curtailing gas to Europe: flows cut 60%, energy prices spiking 3.1×, a sample metric of 28.3 against 22.1. None of it was sourced, and the real record runs the other way. The EU legislated the end of Russian gas itself (Regulation (EU) 2026/261, pipeline deadline 17 June 2026); German gas producer prices are down 8.0% year-on-year, not up; and the March 2026 energy spike came from the Iran–Middle East conflict, not Moscow. Every figure is now taken from a citation you can follow, and the route flipped from Russia→Europe to Europe→Russia because the acting party changed. The Impact Score fell from 74 to 66: the sourced picture is less acute than the invented one, and we are not going to keep the higher number just because it was already published.
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Brent closes above $100 on any day before 31 Dec 2026
initial estimate — the market absorbed an 86% flow collapse without breaching $80, which sets a high bar; the residual risk is that the one-time buffers are now spent
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US–Iran final deal signed by 16 Aug 2026 (the 60-day window from the 17 June MoU)
initial estimate — the window is half gone and both sides resumed strikes inside it
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Hormuz transits back above 100 vessels/day by 30 Sep 2026
initial estimate — traffic recovered once after the 17 June memorandum and collapsed again within three weeks; the July strikes suggest the ceasefire mechanism is not holding
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US formally imposes a transit fee or toll on Hormuz shipping before 31 Dec 2026
initial estimate — proposed at 20% and publicly withdrawn on 14 July in favour of Gulf investment deals; withdrawn is not the same as abandoned
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EU+ asylum claims rise again in 2026
Initial estimate. Three consecutive signals point down — claims −19%, crossings −26%, Syria's own politics changing — and the Pact's border procedures start applying mid-year. Below even odds, but not low: the drivers cited by the EUAA are external and could reverse faster than the policy could respond.
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The Commission opens an infringement proceeding over a Migration Pact obligation before 31 Dec 2026
Initial estimate. Grounded rather than guessed: as of February 2026, 28 of 30 EU+ countries had submitted national implementation plans — Hungary and Poland told the Commission they would not prepare one at all. Refusal is already the observed behaviour; the estimate is about whether it hardens into a formal breach.
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Temporary protection extended past March 2027
Initial estimate. The Directive's own three-year cap has already been breached once by consensus; Ciger reads the Recommendation's language as leaving the door open to indefinite renewal; the Commission has cited the risk of overwhelming asylum systems if it lapses abruptly; and peace talks are stalled. The institutional path of least resistance is another extension.
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On expiry of temporary protection, host states channel remaining Ukrainian beneficiaries into the standard asylum system rather than a successor status, by 31 Dec 2027
Initial estimate. This is the tail risk the Commission itself named: 4.4 million people with no defined legal exit, landing in an asylum system built for 822,000 claims a year. Low, because every actor has an interest in deferring it — which is exactly why it is worth tracking rather than dismissing.
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The UN prices the stakes
Guterres warns that a return to full-scale hostilities would have 'catastrophic consequences for international peace and security and the global economy', with strikes resumed over control of Hormuz.
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A major Russia–China joint venture or localized-production facility is publicly announced before 31 Dec 2026
Initial estimate. This is Mazumdar's prescription — that growth now requires 'joint ventures, localized production, and shared industrial ecosystems rather than cross-border shipments alone'. Scored low because it asks China to sink fixed capital into a sanctioned jurisdiction, which is precisely the exposure its banks are already refusing.
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The EU or US designates at least one further Chinese bank over Russian transactions before 31 Dec 2026
Initial estimate, grounded in a precedent rather than a hunch: Heihe Rural Commercial Bank halted Russian transactions after falling under EU sanctions, which Beznosiuk reads as proof the instrument works and an argument for expanding it — while noting Europe's punitive measures 'lag far behind its critical words'. The gap between the demonstrated tool and its use is what this estimate is about.
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Russia–China trade returns to growth in 2026
Initial estimate. MERICS records record monthly levels in December 2025 even as the year closed down 6.9%, and the decline was principally a price effect on stable volumes — both point to recovery. Held near even odds because the recovery would depend on crude prices we do not forecast, and because Chinese car exports fell 46% on Russian policy that has not been reversed.
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The yuan's share of Russia's trade settlement falls below 25% on the next reported figure before 31 Dec 2026
Initial estimate. It has already fallen from ~40% (Jan 2024) to ~30% under sanctions threats, so the direction is established. Below even odds because more than 95% of Russia–China bilateral settlement is already in rubles and yuan — the remaining decline would have to come from Russia's trade with everyone else.
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UK-India CETA enters into force
99% of Indian exports enter the UK at zero duty. The deal is a goods-trade instrument landing in a market where the oil arbitrage that defined India's leverage is contracting.
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16 Jul 3
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Indian imports of Russian crude back above 1.5 mb/d in any month before 2027
initial estimate — January's 1.1 mb/d is one month, and the IEA attributes it to a restriction that refiners may yet route around
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S.1241 or a successor imposing secondary tariffs on Russian-oil buyers is enacted before 2027
initial estimate — the bill has sat since April 2025 without passing
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17 Jul 9
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The next corridor shows up in food prices
UN-backed monitors project 256,000+ people in Djibouti — about 25% of the population — into crisis-level hunger, naming Bab el-Mandeb trade disruptions among the drivers of food-import costs.
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A durable US–Iran ceasefire — no strikes for 30 straight days — by 30 Sep 2026
initial estimate — the 17 June memorandum held about three weeks before collapsing on 8 July, and strikes were still being exchanged through mid-July; the mechanism has already failed once inside its own window
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A US–Iran final nuclear/security deal is signed by 31 Oct 2026
initial estimate — the 60-day window from the 17 June MoU lapsed amid renewed strikes; talks were said to continue but the principals signalled pessimism
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The IAEA regains access to verify Iran's 60% HEU stockpile before 31 Dec 2026
initial estimate — verification stopped on 28 February, roughly 440.9 kg remains unaccounted for, and no monitoring has resumed while the two sides are still trading fire
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Active US–Iran strikes continue past 31 Aug 2026 — the war outlasts its deal window
initial estimate — the nuclear objective is already met yet the fighting resumed and moved onto shipping, which is the whole finding: the war no longer needs its original reason to keep going
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19 Jul 4
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Russian forces gain more than 400 km² in a single month before 31 Dec 2026
Initial estimate. That threshold is roughly June 2025's rate, and reaching it would require reversing a decline ISW dates to November 2025 while the exchange rate stands near 1,298 casualties per km². Low, and deliberately tracked anyway: this is the number that would falsify the premise of this analysis, and an estimate nobody can lose is not worth publishing.
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Large-scale strikes on Ukraine's grid resume before 31 Dec 2026
Initial estimate, and the most confident on this page. The grid campaign has run every winter since October 2023; CSIS records damage reports rising 358 → 650 → 1,553 across 2023–2025 with energy infrastructure an explicit target category; and January 2026 already produced the Kyiv heating collapse. This is an established seasonal pattern rather than a forecast, which is why it sits high — the uncertainty is scale and timing, not whether.
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H2 2026 civilian casualties exceed H1 2026 on OHCHR figures, resolved by 31 Mar 2027
Initial estimate. The monthly series is still climbing into the half-year boundary — April 238 killed, May 274, June 293, each a new post-April-2022 high — and the winter grid campaign falls inside H2. Held below 70 because the driver is long-range strike volume, which is a production and interception question that can move quickly in either direction, and because no comparable estimate of Ukrainian air-defence supply for H2 was available from a source we could verify.
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Formal Russia–Ukraine talks resume before 31 Dec 2026
Initial estimate. The Kremlin said on 16 July there are no immediate prospects and no signs of any; talks last stalled in February; and the blocking disagreement is structural rather than procedural — Ukraine wants a ceasefire as the precondition, Russia rejects one as a chance for Ukraine to regroup. Not lower, because Turkey remains a willing host and the CSIS reading implies Moscow's whole strike doctrine is aimed at producing a negotiation on its terms — a side that wants talks eventually is not a side that never takes them.
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The war does not pause
A tenth consecutive night of US strikes on Iran; the IRGC reports attacks on US assets in Bahrain and Kuwait and 'massive fires' on two tankers in Hormuz.
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21 Jul 15
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Sharpened 4 prediction labels to state an explicit, measurable resolution criterion and date.
An estimate that cannot resolve can never enter the public track record. These were tracked without a criterion by which they could be scored Confirmed, Incorrect or Partially Correct; the underlying estimates and their history are unchanged.
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Sharpened 2 prediction labels to state an explicit, measurable resolution criterion and date.
An estimate that cannot resolve can never enter the public track record. These were tracked without a criterion by which they could be scored Confirmed, Incorrect or Partially Correct; the underlying estimates and their history are unchanged.
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UN-backed monitors report Djibouti's crisis-level hunger population above 300,000 in any update published by 31 Mar 2027
initial estimate — El Niño and corridor costs push the same direction over the report's six-month window, but an assistance response could cap the count
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A new security, basing or port agreement between an outside power and a Horn of Africa state (Somalia, Eritrea or Djibouti) is announced by 31 Dec 2026
initial estimate — a US presidential adviser doing separate consultations in Cairo is deal-shaped diplomacy, but Horn agreements have a record of being announced slowly and unravelling faster
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A commercial vessel is attacked in the Red Sea or Bab el-Mandeb, attributed to a party to the Iran–US war, by 30 Sep 2026
initial estimate — the war's targets have already shifted to shipping in Hormuz, and monitors already report 'geopolitical tensions' around Bab el-Mandeb; but no attack in this corridor is documented by anything read this run
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Cairo convenes the Horn
Egypt, the US adviser for Africa, Somalia and Eritrea hold separate consultations in Cairo. The Red Sea and the Horn are treated as 'a single strategic arena'.
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Sharpened 3 prediction labels to state an explicit, measurable resolution criterion and date.
An estimate that cannot resolve can never enter the public track record. These were tracked without a criterion by which they could be scored Confirmed, Incorrect or Partially Correct; the underlying estimates and their history are unchanged.
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Sharpened 2 prediction labels to state an explicit, measurable resolution criterion and date.
An estimate that cannot resolve can never enter the public track record. These were tracked without a criterion by which they could be scored Confirmed, Incorrect or Partially Correct; the underlying estimates and their history are unchanged.
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23 Jul 3
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Sweden declares mining national security
The Swedish government designates critical-minerals and rare-earth mining a national security interest to speed permits and attract investment — weeks after parliament streamlined permitting for nuclear materials in June 2026.
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24 Jul 4
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China imposes or tightens a formal rare-earth export restriction that affects EU buyers by 31 Mar 2027
initial estimate — Beijing has used rare-earth export controls as trade-war leverage before and the tools are already in place; whether it aims one at the EU specifically in this window is the uncertain part
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LKAB secures a full environmental permit (exploitation concession plus environmental-court approval) for rare-earth extraction at Per Geijer by 31 Dec 2027
initial estimate — LKAB's own timeline is 10–15 years, the Environmental Code is among the EU's strictest, and the deposit overlaps reindeer-herding land with constitutional and ECHR obligations; a national-security designation speeds this but cannot clear it inside 18 months
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Sweden's government tables or enacts a concrete instrument implementing the national-security mining designation (a bill or ordinance that changes the permitting process) by 30 Jun 2027
initial estimate — a declared national strategy with a deputy PM behind it usually reaches a legislative or regulatory instrument within a year; the June 2026 nuclear-materials permitting law shows the government already moving in this direction
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29 Jul 12
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The Arctic Council resumes full working-group participation with Russia before 31 Dec 2027
initial estimate — the 2025 joint statement shows the forum has not collapsed entirely, but the underlying boycott is tied to the war in Ukraine, which shows no sign of resolving on this timeline
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Russia's troop presence opposite the Finnish border reaches or exceeds 50,000 by 31 Dec 2027
initial estimate — Finland's own army commander names 80,000 as the potential ceiling from a roughly 20,000 baseline, but a build-up of this scale typically takes years and the Karelia garrison is still described as 'under development' rather than complete
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The US Coast Guard takes delivery of its first new Arctic Security Cutter by 31 Dec 2028
initial estimate — 2028 is the contracted target across multiple 2026 announcements, but first-of-class naval shipbuilding programmes slip more often than they hold
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Australia takes delivery of its first Virginia-class submarine from the US Navy by 31 Dec 2032
initial estimate — US production has run at ~1.1–1.2 boats/yr against a needed 2.33/yr, more than a third of the existing US attack-submarine fleet is laid up awaiting maintenance, and the Navy's own admiral in charge does not expect a stable 2/yr rate before the 2030s
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The UK government publishes a formal response accepting or rejecting the Defence Committee's April 2026 recommendations by 30 Jun 2027
initial estimate — government responses to select-committee reports are a normal Parliamentary mechanism and are usually produced within a year, though the substance of the response (accept vs. dispute the criticisms) is the open question, not the fact of a response
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BAE Systems cuts steel on the first SSN-AUKUS hull at Barrow-in-Furness by 31 Dec 2027
initial estimate — the Defence Investment Plan names 2027 explicitly and the reactor cores are already under construction, but the Defence Committee's April 2026 report found shipyard-upgrade timelines already slipping
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Georgia's state-led Anaklia port begins commercial operations by 31 Dec 2029
initial estimate — the Georgian government has now named its own 2029 target after the original Chinese-consortium plan changed hands in July 2026, but the project has already run years behind its earlier timelines under different ownership models
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The EU formally restarts Georgia's accession process before 31 Dec 2028
initial estimate — Georgia's own government set 2028 as its earliest voluntary return to accession activities, the EU suspended the process in December 2024, and the 'foreign agent' law crackdown has continued into 2026 rather than easing
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Middle Corridor cargo volume reaches 10 million tonnes in a single calendar year by 31 Dec 2029
initial estimate — World Bank and ADB project roughly a tripling of 2024's ~4.5 Mt by 2030, which would land just under this bar; reaching it a year early depends on the bottlenecks (Anaklia, Georgian port capacity) actually getting resolved rather than just changing ownership
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Not dated 1
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The material stays missing
The IAEA still cannot account for the ~440.9 kg of 60% enriched uranium; an estimated 265–287 kg is thought to sit in Isfahan's spared tunnels. The one target the strikes could not reach is the one that was moved before they began.
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